On the Communication Complexity of Key-Agreement Protocols by Haitner, Iftach et al.
On the Communication Complexity of
Key-Agreement Protocols
Iftach Haitner1
The Blavatnik school of computer science, Tel Aviv University, Israel
iftachh@cs.tau.ac.il
Noam Mazor2
The Blavatnik school of computer science, Tel Aviv University, Israel
joanrpublic@dummycollege.org
Rotem Oshman3
The Blavatnik school of computer science, Tel Aviv University, Israel
rotem.oshman@gmail.com
Omer Reingold4
Computer Science Department, Stanford University, USA
reingold@stanford.edu
Amir Yehudayoff5
Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Israel
amir.yehudayoff@gmail.com
Abstract
Key-agreement protocols whose security is proven in the random oracle model are an important
alternative to protocols based on public-key cryptography. In the random oracle model, the
parties and the eavesdropper have access to a shared random function (an “oracle”), but the
parties are limited in the number of queries they can make to the oracle. The random oracle
serves as an abstraction for black-box access to a symmetric cryptographic primitive, such as
a collision resistant hash. Unfortunately, as shown by Impagliazzo and Rudich [STOC ’89] and
Barak and Mahmoody [Crypto ’09], such protocols can only guarantee limited secrecy: the key of
any `-query protocol can be revealed by an O(`2)-query adversary. This quadratic gap between
the query complexity of the honest parties and the eavesdropper matches the gap obtained by
the Merkle’s Puzzles protocol of Merkle [CACM ’78].
In this work we tackle a new aspect of key-agreement protocols in the random oracle model:
their communication complexity. In Merkle’s Puzzles, to obtain secrecy against an eavesdropper
that makes roughly `2 queries, the honest parties need to exchange Ω(`) bits. We show that for
protocols with certain natural properties, ones that Merkle’s Puzzle has, such high communication
is unavoidable. Specifically, this is the case if the honest parties’ queries are uniformly random, or
alternatively if the protocol uses non-adaptive queries and has only two rounds. Our proof for the
first setting uses a novel reduction from the set-disjointness problem in two-party communication
complexity. For the second setting we prove the lower bound directly, using information-theoretic
arguments.
Understanding the communication complexity of protocols whose security is proven (in the
random-oracle model) is an important question in the study of practical protocols. Our results
and proof techniques are a first step in this direction.
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1 Introduction
In a key-agreement protocol [5], two parties communicating over an insecure channel want to
securely agree on a shared secret key, such that an eavesdropper observing their communication
cannot find the key. For example, given a hash function h : [n]→ [N ] that is hard to invert,
the players can execute the following protocol, called Merkle’s puzzles [13]: we fix an arbitrary
parameter ` ≈
√
n, and the parties select uniformly random subsets A = {a1, . . . , a`} , B =
{b1, . . . , b`} ⊆ [n] (respectively) of size `. We choose `, n such that with constant probability
there is a unique intersection, |A ∩ B| = 1. The first party evaluates h on every element
a ∈ A, and sends h(a1), . . . , h(a`) to the second party, which then looks for a unique element
b ∈ B such that h(b) = h(ai) for some i ∈ [`]. If found, the second party sends the index i
to the first party and outputs b as the secret key; the second party outputs ai as the secret
key. Because h is a “good” hash function and h(b) = h(ai), it is likely that b = ai, so the
players output the same key. Moreover, since h is hard to invert, an eavesdropper that tries
to find the secret key after seeing h(a1), . . . , h(a`), i must essentially compute h on the entire
universe in order to invert h and find ai. Thus, we have a quadratic gap between the work
performed by the eavesdropper, which must compute Ω(`2) hashes, and the work performed
by the parties, which compute ` hashes each.
Ideally we would strive for an exponential gap between the work required to break the
security of the protocol and the work of the honest parties. There are numerous candidate
constructions of such key-agreement schemes, e.g., [17, 14, 1, 12], based on assumptions
implying that public-key encryption schemes exist. A fundamental open question is whether
we can design key-agreement protocols based on the security of symmetric primitives (e.g.,
collision resistant hash); the security of such primitives is believed to be more robust than
public-key encryption. A very important step in this direction was made by Barak and
Mahmoody[2] (following Impagliazzo and Rudich[10]): they showed that as long as the
symmetric primitive is used as a black box, the quadratic gap achieved by Merkle’s puzzles
is the best possible.
The notion of “black box” is formalized by the random oracle model: instead of a concrete
hash function h, we assume that the parties have access to a random oracle F : [n]→ [n], a
perfectly random function. The random oracle is “the best hash function possible” (w.h.p.),
so lower bounds proven in the random oracle model hold for any instantiation where the
oracle is replaced by a one-way function. Thus, the lower bound of Barak and Mahmoody
rules out any black-box key-agreement scheme from one-way functions that achieves a better
than quadratic gap between the eavesdropper’s work and the honest parties.
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While a quadratic gap between the `-query honest parties and the `2-query eavesdropper
might not seem like much, and ideally we would wish for an exponential gap, on modern
architecture it can yield a good enough advantage, assuming that security is preserved when
the random oracle is replaced with a fixed hash function. For example, a consumer-level
CPU (Intel Core i5-6600) can compute 5 million SHA-256 hashes per second, and specialized
hardware for SHA-256 computation (for example, AntMiner S9) can compute 14 × 1012
hashes per second [3]. It follows that if the honest parties spend one second of computation
on standard CPU, an attacker with specialized hardware can violate the security of Merkle’s
puzzles in less than a second. However, if the parties spend one second on specialized
hardware, an attacker with specialized hardware has to spend more than 200, 000 years to
break the scheme.
So, are Merkle’s puzzles a practical and realistic key-agreement scheme? The answer is
probably not: even setting aside the question of replacing the random oracle by a concrete
hash function, in Merkle’s puzzles, the honest parties send each other Ω̃(`) bits to obtain
security against an eavesdropper that makes roughly `2 queries. In our example above, if
we instantiate Merkle’s puzzles using SHA-256 for one second on specialized hardware, the
first party would need to send more than 100 terabytes to the second party. A fundamental
question is whether this high communication burden is inherent to secure key-agreement,
and more generally, what is the communication cost of cryptographic protocols in the
random oracle model and other oracle models. In this paper we initiate the study of the
communication complexity of cryptographic protocols in the random-oracle model.
1.1 Our Results
We show that for random-oracle protocols with certain natural properties, the high commu-
nication incurred by Merkle’s puzzles is unavoidable: in order to achieve security against an
adversary that can ask Θ(`2) queries, the two parties must exchange Ω(`) bits of communica-
tion. Specifically, we show that the bound above holds for protocols where the parties’ queries
are a uniformly random set, and also for two-round protocols that make non-adaptive (but
arbitrary) queries.6 We stress that a general lower bound for non-adaptive key-agreement
protocols would imply a lower bound on the communication complexity of the set-intersection
problem. This fact suggests that it is unlikely to find a simple proof for the general case.
To simplify the statements of our results, we focus here on key-agreement protocols whose
agreement parameter, the probability that the players output the same key, is larger by some
constant than their secrecy parameter, the probability that an eavesdropper can find the key.
Uniform-query protocols.
We say that a random-oracle protocol makes uniform queries if each party’s oracle queries
are a uniformly random set. We give the following lower bound on the communication
complexity of such protocols.
I Theorem 1 (lower bound on uniform-queries protocols, informal). Any `-uniform-query
key-agreement protocol achieving non-trivial secrecy against o(`2)-query adversaries has
communication complexity Ω(`).
This theorem is proved by a reduction from set-disjointness, a problem in communication
complexity that is known to require high communication.
6 These are both properties of Merkle’s puzzles.
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Two-round non-adaptive protocols.
An oracle protocol is said to make non-adaptive queries if the distribution of queries made
by the players is fixed in advance, i.e., it is determined before the parties communicate with
each other and does not depend on the oracle’s answers. We give the following lower bound
on the communication complexity of such protocols.
I Theorem 2 (lower bound on two-message non-adaptive protocols, informal). Any two-message
`-query non-adaptive key-agreement protocol of non-trivial secrecy against q-query adversaries
has communication complexity Ω(q/`).
Once again this lower bound is nearly-tight with Merkle’s puzzles, where q = Θ(`2), and the
communication cost is Θ̃(`).7
Following Barak and Mahmoody [2] and Impagliazzo and Rudich [10]), we prove this
lower bound by presenting an eavesdropper that makes q queries and prevents the parties
from exploiting the advantage they gain by their joint random oracle calls.
In [2], the communication cost of the protocol is not taken into account: their eavesdropper
makes O(`2) queries and has high probability of finding all intersection queries (i.e., all
queries that were asked by both players). In our case, if the protocol has communication cost
C, then to prove Theorem 2, our eavesdropper must make only O(C · `) queries (to show
the trade-off that C = Ω(q/`)). If C  `, our eavesdropper makes much fewer queries than
the eavesdropper in [2, 10], and in particular it cannot discover all the intersection queries.
Instead, our eavesdropper asks only queries that the players were able to learn are in their
intersection. If a query is in the intersection, but the players have not communicated this
fact to each other, then the eavesdropper will not necessarily ask this query (unlike [2, 10]).
Finding the correct definition for what it means to “learn” that a given query is in the
intersection, and constructing an eavesdropper that makes only O(C · `) queries, are the
main difficulty in our proof.
1.2 Related Work
Impagliazzo and Rudich [10] showed that the key of any `-query key-agreement protocol
in the random-oracle model can be revealed by an Õ(`6) query eavesdropper. Barak and
Mahmoody [2] improve this bound and present an O(`2) query eavesdropper for this task,
which shows that Merkle puzzles is optimal in this respect. Haitner, Omri, and Zarosim [9]
used the machinery of [2] to relate the security of protocols that do not use a random oracle
and solve tasks with no input, to the security of no-input protocols in the random-oracle
model against an O(`2)-query adversary. Finding limitations on the usefulness of random
oracles for protocols that do take input seems to be a more difficult question. Chor and
Kushilevitz [4] and Mahmoody et al. [11] made some progress in this direction. Finally,
Haitner, Hoch, Reingold, and Segev [7] gave lower bounds on the communication complexity
of statistically hiding commitments and single-server private information retrieval in a weaker
oracle model that captures the hardness of one-way functions/permutation more closely than
the random-oracle model.
7 This theorem is also nearly-tight for any q, with a version of Merkle’s puzzle, in which Alice is sending
Θ(q/l) answers, from a universe of size Θ(q).
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1.3 Organization
We begin by giving the formal definitions and notation used throughout the paper in Section
2. High-level overview of our proof techniques is given in Sections 3 and 4. For full proofs,
see the full version of this paper in [8].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
We use calligraphic letters to denote sets, uppercase for random variables and lowercase for
values. For m ∈ N, let [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. For a random variable X, let x R← X to denote that
x is chosen according to X. Similarly, for a set S let s R←S to denote that s is chosen according
to the uniform distribution over S. The support of the distribution D, denoted Supp(D), is
defined as {u ∈ U : PrD [u] > 0}. The statistical distance between two distributions P and
Q over a finite set U , denoted SD(P,Q), is defined as 12
∑
u∈U |PrP [u]− PrQ [u] |, which is
equal to maxS⊂U (PrP [S]− PrQ [S]).
For a vector ~X = X1, ..., Xn and an index i ∈ [n], let X<i denote the vector X1, ..., Xi−1
and X≤i denote the vector X1, ..., Xi. For a set of indexes T = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ [n] such that
i1 < i2 < · · · < ik, let XT denote the vector Xi1 , . . . , Xik . Similarly, XT,<i denotes the
vector XT∩{1,...,i−1}. For a function f , let f( ~X) = (f(X1), ..., f(Xn)).
For random variables A and B we use A|B=b to denote the distribution of A condition on
the event B = b, and A× B to denote the product between the marginal distributions of A
and B. When A is independent from B we write A⊥B to emphasize that this is the case.
2.2 Interactive Protocols
A two-party protocol Π = (A,B) is a pair of probabilistic interactive Turing machines. The
communication between the Turing machines A and B is carried out in rounds, where in
each round one of the parties is active and the other party is idle. In the j-th round of the
protocol, the currently active party P acts according to its partial view, writing some value
on its output tape, and then sending a message to the other party (i.e., writing the message
on the common tape). The communication transcript (henceforth, the transcript) of a given
execution of the protocol Π = (A,B), is the list of messages m exchanged between the parties
in an execution of the protocol, where m1,...,j denotes the first j messages in m. A view of a
party contains its input, its random tape and the messages exchanged by the parties during
the execution. Specifically, A’s view is a tuple vA = (iA, rA,m), where iA is A’s input, rA are
A’s random coins, and m is the transcript of the execution. Let outA denote the output of A
in the end of the protocol, and outB B’s output. Notice that given a protocol, the transcript
and the outputs are deterministic function of the joint view (iA, rA, iB, rB). For a joint view
v, let trans(v), outA(v) and outB(v) be the transcript of the protocol and the parties’ outputs
determined by v. For a distribution D we denote the distribution over the parties’ joint view
in a random execution of Π, with inputs drawn from D by Π(D).
A protocol Π has r rounds, if for every possible random tapes for the parties, the number
of rounds is exactly r. The Communication Complexity of a protocol Π, denoted as CC(Π)
is the length of the transcript of the protocol in the worst case.
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2.3 Oracle-Aided Protocols
An oracle-aided two-party protocol Π = (A,B) is a pair of interactive Turing machines, where
each party has an additional tape called the oracle tape; the Turing machine can make a
query to the oracle by writing a string q on its tape. It then receives a string ans (denoting
the answer for this query) on the oracle tape. An oracle-aided protocol is `-queries protocol
if each party makes at most ` queries during each run of the protocol. In a non-adaptive
oracle-aided protocol, the parties choose their queries before the protocol starts and before
querying the oracle. A uniform query oracle-aided protocol, is a non-adaptive protocol in
which the parties queries are chosen uniformly form a predetermined set.
2.4 Key-Agreement Protocols
Since we are giving lower bounds, we focus on single bit protocols.
I Definition 3 (key-agreement protocol). Let 0 ≤ γ, α ≤ 1 and q ∈ N . A two-party boolean
output protocol Π = (A,B) is a (q, α, γ)-key-agreement relative to a function family F , if the
following hold:













Ef (trans(v)) = outA(v)
]
≤ γ.
If F is a trivial function family (e.g., F contains only the identity function), then all
correlation between the parties’ view is implied by the transcript. Hence, an adversary that
on a given transcript τ samples a random view for A that is consistent with τ , and outputs
whatever A would upon this view, agrees with B with the same probability as does A. This
simple argument yields the following fact:
For every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ < 1− α, there exists no (q, α, γ)-key-agreement protocol
relative to the trivial family.
2.5 Entropy and Information
In the proof we often need to measure differences between various distributions. For this
purpose we use f-divergences: given a convex function f : R → R with f(1) = 0, and
distributions P,Q, the f -divergence of P from Q is defined as
Df (P ‖ Q) =
∑
q∈Q
Pr [Q = q] f
(
Pr [P = q]
Pr [Q = q]
)
.
Specifically, the two f -divergences we use in this paper are the statistical distance, obtained
by taking f(x) = |x− 1|/2, and the KL divergence, obtained by taking f(x) = x log x. Each
has its own nice properties and disadvantages: statistical distance is bounded in [0, 1] but it
is not additive, while KL divergence is additive but unbounded.
We frequently need to measure the “amount of dependence” between two random variables.
Let (X,Y) ∼ PX,Y be random variables jointly distributed according to PX,Y, and let PX, PY
be the marginal distribution of X and Y, respectively. Also, let PX × PY be the product
distribution where X and Y are sampled independently of each other, each from its marginal
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distribution PX, PY (respectively). To quantify the dependence between X and Y, we measure
the difference between their joint distribution and the product of the marginals: formally, we
define
If (X; Y) = Df (PX,Y ‖ PX × PY).
This generalizes the usual notion of mutual information, which is the special case of If where
we use KL divergence (i.e., when f = x log x). For clarity, when we use KL divergence we
omit the subscript f , and when using statistical distance, we use the notation ISD (instead
of If(x)=|x−1|/2).
Finally, we also need the notion of conditional mutual information, which is simply
the average mutual information between two variables X,Y, where the average is taken
over a third random variable Z. Formally, let (X,Y,Z) ∼ PX,Y,Z. For any value z, let
PX,Y|Z=z, PX|Z=z, PY|Z=z be the joint distribution of X,Y and the marginals of X and Y,
respectively, all conditioned on the event Z = z.
Then we define If (X; Y|Z) = Ez∼PZ
[
Df (PX,Y|Z=z ‖ PX|Z=z × PY|Z=z)
]
.
In the next sections we outline the strategy of the proofs.
3 Uniform-Query Protocols: Proof Outline
Our lower bound for uniform-query key-agreement protocols is proved via a reduction to set
disjointness, a classical problem in two-party communication complexity.
In the set disjointness problem, we have two players, Alice and Bob. The players receive
inputs X,Y ⊆ [n], respectively, of size |X| = |Y | = `, and the players must determine
whether X ∩ Y = ∅. To do this, the players communicate with each other, and the question
is how many bits they must exchange. It is known [16] that for any sufficiently large n ∈ N,
if the size of the sets is ` = n/4, then the players must exchange Ω(n) bits to solve set
disjointness, and this holds even for randomized protocols where the players have access to
shared randomness and only need to succeed with probability 2/3. Here, we require high
success probability on any input, not over some specific input distribution. We note that in
the 2-party communication complexity model there is no random oracle.
The connection between set disjointness and key agreement comes from the fact that
the only correlation between the parties’ views in a key agreement protocol comes from the
intersection queries, the queries that both players ask and Eve does not know. Indeed, if
Alice asks A ⊆ [n] and Bob asks B ⊆ [n], and the random oracle is F : [n] → [n], then
F (A \ (A∩B)) and F (B \ (A∩B)) are independent of each other. In particular, if A∩B = ∅,
then F (A) and F (B) are independent, and intuitively, in this case the players cannot securely
agree on a secret key, because they have no advantage over the eavesdropper. On the other
hand, if A ∩ B 6= ∅, then the players can exploit the correlation induced by F (A ∩ B) to
securely agree on a secret key. Thus, any secure key agreement protocol “behaves differently”
depending on whether A ∩ B = ∅ or not, and we can use this to solve the set disjointness
problem.
Suppose that we are given a secure key-agreement protocol Π, where the players make
` uniformly-random queries to an oracle F : [n] → [n]. For simplicity we assume that the
protocol has perfect agreement, that is, the players always output the same key, and that the
security parameter is 3/4, that is, an eavesdropper has probability at most 3/4 of outputting
the same key as the players. Our full proof does not make these assumptions.
Now, we want to construct from the key-agreement protocol Π, which uses a random
oracle, a protocol Π′ for set disjointness, without a random oracle (as usual in communication
complexity). To this end, we consider two possible ways of simulating Π without an oracle:
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ΛCom: the players use their shared randomness to simulate the oracle. They interpret the
shared randomness as a random function F : [n]→ [n], and whenever Π wants to query
some element q ∈ [n], the players use F(q) as the oracle’s answer.
ΛDist: the players use their private randomness to simulate the oracle. Alice and Bob
interpret their private randomness as random functions FA,FB : [n]→ [n], respectively.
Whenever Π indicates that Alice should query an element q ∈ [n], she uses FA(q) as the
answer, while Bob uses FB(q).
The first simulation, ΛCom, is “perfect”: it produces exactly the correct distribution of
transcripts and outputs under our key-agreement protocol Π. In particular, the keys produced
by the players in ΛCom always agree, and an eavesdropper that sees the transcript of ΛCom
(but not the shared randomness) can find the key with probability at most 3/4.
On the other hand, the second simulation ΛDist is “wrong”, because the players do not use
the same random function to simulate the random oracle. In fact, it is known that without
shared randomness, secure key agreement is impossible, as an eavesdropper that sees the
transcript can find the key with the same probability that the players have of agreeing with
each other. Therefore there are two possible cases:
Agreement gap: The probability that the players agree on the key in ΛDist is at most 7/8
(compared to one in ΛCom), or
Secrecy gap: There is an eavesdropper E that guesses Alice’s key in ΛDist with probability
at least 7/8 (compared to 3/4 in ΛCom).
(Instead of 7/8 we could have used here any constant probability in (3/4, 1), but in the full
proof this choice depends on the agreement and security parameters of Π.)
We divide into cases, depending on which of the two gaps we have.
Agreement gap
Assume that the players agree with probability at most 7/8 in ΛDist. For simplicity, let
us make the stronger assumption that for any intersection size c > 0, the probability of
agreement between the players is at most 7/8, even conditioned on the event that |A∩B| = c.
A general key-agreement protocol might not satisfy this assumption, which complicates the
full proof significantly; see the full version of this paper for the details.
So, we assumed that whenever the intersection is non-empty, the players agree with
probability at most 7/8. Observe, however, that when the intersection is empty (A∩B = ∅),
the distribution of transcript and outputs in ΛDist is the same as in Π: although each player
uses a different random function, they never ask the same query, so there is no inconsistency.
Therefore, conditioned on A∩B = ∅, in ΛDist the players have perfect agreement (as in Π). In
other words, ΛDist behaves very differently when A ∩B = ∅, in which case the players always
agree on the key, compared to the general case, where the players agree with probability at
most 7/8. We use this fact to check whether A ∩B = ∅. Thus, by checking whether or not
they got the same key in ΛDist, the players get an indication for whether or not A ∩B = ∅.
Our set disjointness protocol Π′ is defined as follows. Given inputsX,Y ⊆ [n], respectively,
the players simulate ΛDist several times. In each simulation, the players agree on a random
permutation σ : [n]→ [n] using their shared randomness, and then the players simulate ΛDist
using their permuted inputs as the query set; that is, Alice feeds A = σ(X) to ΛDist as her
query set, and Bob feeds B = σ(Y ) to ΛDist as his query set. Note that A,B are uniformly
random, subject to having an intersection of size |X ∩ Y |.
After each simulation of ΛDist, the players send each other the keys output under ΛDist,
and check if they got the same key. Finally, they output “X ∩ Y = ∅” iff they got the same
key in all the simulations of ΛDist.
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Since ΛDist has perfect agreement when there is no intersection, the players always succeed
when X∩Y = ∅. However, by assumption, whenever X∩Y 6= ∅, the probability of agreement
in ΛDist is at most 7/8, so if we repeat ΛDist sufficiently many times, the probability that all
instances output the same key will be at most 1/3.
Secrecy gap
In this case we convert ΛCom and ΛDist into a pair of protocols with an agreement gap, and
then proceed as above.
Consider the protocol Λ′Dist where the parties acts as in ΛDist, but at the end, Bob executes
the eavesdropper E on the transcript, and outputs the key that E outputs. Define Λ′Com
analogously.
By assumption, E guesses Alice’s output in ΛDist with probability at least 7/8, but in ΛCom
it succeeds with probability at most 3/4. Thus, in Λ′Dist the players agree with probability
at least 7/8, but in Λ′Com they agree with probability at most 3/4; there is a gap of at least
1/8 between the probability of agreement in the two protocols (although they have switched
roles and now Λ′Dist has the higher agreement probability). Note also that Λ′Dist does not
have agreement probability 1, as we assumed for simplicity above, but our full proof can
handle this case.
Formal statement
Here we give the formal statements that we prove for uniform-query protocols. Formally, our
reduction is to set-disjointness over the distribution below, which known to be hard for low
complexity protocols.
I Definition 4 (hard distribution for set-disjointness). For ` ∈ N, let
Q0` = {X ,Y ⊂ [`] : |X | = |Y| = b`/4c , X ∩ Y = ∅} and let
Q1` = {X ,Y ⊂ [`] : |X | = |Y| = b`/4c , |X ∩ Y| = 1}. Let D0` and D1` be the uniform distri-
bution over Q0` and Q1` respectively, and let D` = 34 ·D
0
` + 14 ·D
1
` .
Razborov [16] has shown that solving set-disjointness D` with small error require high
communication complexity.
I Theorem 5 (hardness of D`, [16]). Exists ε > 0 such that for every ` ∈ N and a protocol
Π that solves set-disjointness over D` with error ε, it holds that CC(Π) ≥ Ω(`).
For a finite set S, let FS =
{
f : S 7→ {0, 1}∗
}
be the family of all functions from S to
binary strings. Our reduction is stated in the following theorem.
I Theorem 6 (from uniform-query key-agreement protocols to set-disjointness). Assume exists
an `-uniform-query (0, α, γ)-key agreement protocol relative to FS , for some set S, of com-
munication complexity c. Then there exists a protocol for solving set-disjointness over D`
with ε error and communication complexity 2
15·`4·log 1/ε
|S|2(1−α−γ)4 · c.
Note that the above theorem holds also for protocols that are only secure against
eavesdropper without access to the oracle. Combining theorems 5 and 6 yields the following
bound on the communication complexity of uniform-query key-agreement protocols.
I Theorem 7 (Main result for uniform-inputs protocols). For any `-uniform-query (q, α, γ)-key
agreement protocol Π relative to FS , it holds that CC(Π) ∈ Ω((1− α− γ)4q2/`3).
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What about general protocols?
It was important for our reduction to assume that the key-agreement protocol makes
uniformly-random queries. Indeed, this reduction fails in the general case: consider the
protocol where Alice and Bob always query 1, and output F(1) as their secret key. This
protocol is completely insecure, since the eavesdropper can also query 1 and output F(1). But
our reduction would not work for it, because the input distribution where both players get
the set {1} is not hard for set disjointness (indeed it is trivial). We see that the “hardness” of
secure key-agreement is not necessarily that it is hard for the players to find their intersection
queries, but that the eavesdropper should not be able to predict the intersection queries that
the players use. Our second lower bound makes this intuition explicit and uses it to get a
lower bound on two-round protocols with arbitrary (but non-adaptive) query distributions.
4 Two-Message Non-Adaptive Protocols: Proof Outline
In this section we describe a lower bound on the communication cost of any key-agreement
protocol that makes non-adaptive queries and uses two rounds of communication: we show
that any such protocol that makes ` queries and is secure against an adversary that makes q
queries must send a total of Ω(q/`) bits. In particular, taking q = Θ(`2), this shows that
Merkle’s puzzles is optimal in its communication cost. Formally, we show the following
bound, where Fn is the family of all functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n:
I Theorem 8 (Main theorem for two-message, non-adaptive protocols). For any n ∈ N, the
communication complexity of a two-message, non-adaptive, `-query (q, α, γ)-key-agreement
protocol relative to Fn is at least
(1− α− γ)2q
502` − 6.
In this proof, we once again relate the parties’ advantage over the eavesdropper to the
information they gained about the intersection of their query sets. We show that to produce
a shared key, the parties need to learn a lot of information about this intersection. Moreover,
the query sets and their intersection need to be “unpredictable” (have high min-entropy)
given the transcript, otherwise an eavesdropper could make the same queries and output the
same key.
4.1 Some examples
Let us illustrate the ideas behind the lower bound by way of some examples.
Example 1
We already discussed the na ive example where both players query 1 and output F(1), and
said that it is insecure because the eavesdropper can predict the intersection query. Here
is another instantiation of this idea: Alice and Bob view the domain `2 as an `× ` matrix,
so that the oracle queries are represented by pairs (i, j) ∈ [`]2. Alice chooses a row a ∈ [`],
and queries all the elements of the row (that is, all pairs (a, j) where j ∈ [`]); Bob chooses
a column b ∈ [`] and queries all the elements of the column (all pairs (i, b) where i ∈ [`]).
Then, Alice sends a to Bob, who responds with F(a, b). From F(a, b), Alice can compute b,
by finding the (w.h.p. unique) index j such that F(a, b) = F(a, j). Both players output the
first bit of b as the key.
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This protocol is slightly less naïve than the previous one: now there are no queries that
have high prior probability of being asked, and the index b of the query that determines the
key is uniformly random a-priori. However, once Alice sends a to Bob, the game is up: Eve
can also query row a and find b the same way Alice does.
We see that in addition to queries that have a high prior probability of being asked, Eve
also needs to ask queries that have a high posterior probability of being asked, after she sees
M1. It turns out that this is enough: if we were to continue for more than 2 rounds, then
Eve would also need to ask queries that become likely after seeing M2, and so on, but to
prove a 2-round lower bound, Eve does not need to ask these queries. Intuitively, if a query
only becomes likely after M2 is sent, then this is “too late” for it to be useful to the players,
and Eve can ignore it.
Example 2
First, both players query 1. Then they carry out the protocol from Example 1, but all
messages are “encrypted” by XOR-ing them with F(1).
From this example we see that Eve needs to be somewhat adaptive: when she decides
what queries to ask after seeing M1, she must incorporate the queries she asked before the
first round (in this case, she would query 1). Essentially, when Eve tries to understand what
the players have done in round i, she should take into account all the queries she made up to
round i.
Should Eve be adaptive inside each round? In other words, after seeing M1, should she
ask all queries E1 that became likely, then compute which new queries are now likely given
M1, E1, and so on, until she reaches a fixpoint?
It turns out that for our purposes here, because we consider non-adaptive protocols, Eve
does not need to do this.
Heavy queries
Our attacker Eve tries to break the security of the protocol by asking all queries that are
“somewhat likely” to be asked by the players; these queries are called heavy queries. Informally,
a query q ∈ {0, 1}n is heavy after round i if given the transcript up to round i (inclusive),
and given Eve’s queries up to round i, the probability that q is asked by one (or both) of the
players exceeds some threshold δ which is fixed in advance.
More formally, the set Ei of heavy queries after round i is defined by induction on rounds,
as follows: the a-priory heavy queries, E0, are given by
E0 = {q ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr [q ∈ X ∪ Y ] ≥ δ} .
These are queries that are “somewhat likely” to be asked before the protocol begins. For
i > 0, we define
Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {q ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr [q ∈ X ∪ Y | M≤i,F(Ei−1)] ≥ δ} .
In other words, after round i, Eve asks all queries q ∈ {0, 1}n that have probability at least
δ of being queried by the players, given the messages M≤i that Eve observed up to round i
and the heavy queries she asked before, Ei−1.
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A simplified normal form for protocols
To simplify the proof of the lower bound, we first apply an easy transformation to the
protocol: given a key agreement protocol Π, we construct a protocol Π′, which has nearly
the same communication and query complexity as Π, the same number of rounds, and the
same agreement and nearly the same security parameters. But Π′ also has the following
properties: first, Π′ has no a-priori heavy queries, that is, E0 = ∅; and second, the secret key
output by Bob in Π′ is the first bit of Bob’s last query. This easy transformation is omitted
in this overview.
Measuring the Players’ Advantage Over Eve
As we saw in the examples above, the players’ ability to produce a shared secret key is closely
tied to how much information the players have that Eve does not have about the intersection
of the query sets, X ∩ Y .
To quantify this advantage, define the following random variables:
Si = (X ∩Y) \ Ei−1, the intersection queries that have not been asked by Eve.
F(Si): the answers to the queries in Si.
V iE = (E ′i ,F(E ′i)): a subset of the heavy queries for the previous round, and the answers
to them. Here, E ′i ⊆ Ei is a subset that will be defined later (and depends on the round
number i). For technical reasons, it is convenient to use only some of the heavy queries in
some contexts; essentially, in some places in our proof, Eve uses only some of her power.
This helps us avoid some unnecessary dependencies.
We measure the advantage gained by the players in round i by an expression of the form:
If (Si,F(Si); Mi|Z,Vi−1E ,M<i), (1)
where If is the information with respect to the f -divergence, Mi,M<i are the i-th message
and the messages of rounds 1, . . . , i− 1, Z is the query set of the player that sent Mi (either
X or Y, depending on the round number i). Note that Eve uses her heavy queries from the
previous rounds, Vi−1E , to “try to understand” what is going on in the current round.
Intuitively, this expression measures how much information the i-th message conveys
about the intersection queries and their answers, which Eve cannot guess. For this reason,
the random variable Si excludes intersection queries that were asked by Eve. Notice that
on the right-hand side we condition on Eve’s view (or on things Eve can sample): Eve has
already seen the messages M<i and asked the heavy queries Vi−1E = (E ′i−1,F(E ′i−1)), and she
can sample the queries Z, either X or Y, from the correct distribution given the transcript
and her queries. Crucially, this does not require her to make any oracle queries: we do not
require her to sample the answers F(Z), only the queries Z. In other words, Eve can pretend
to be whichever player the query set Z belongs to, and by conditioning on her view, we
essentially neutralize all the information that Eve can extract about the intersection. Thus,
the expression in (1) measures the information the players gain about the intersection but
that is hidden from Eve. 8
Our proof consists of showing:
8 As we said above, we use only some of Eve’s heavy queries, E ′i−1 ⊆ Ei, so this intuition is not completely
accurate; specifically, when (1) is large, it does not mean that Eve cannot guess a lot about the
intersection, because she could use the full set Ei. However, when (1) is small, then indeed Eve knows
almost as much about the intersection as the players do, because her view includes Vi−1E (and possibly
more).
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Step I: After the first message M1 is sent, the advantage gained is small, only O(δ|M1|).
For this part of the proof we use KL-divergence to measure the advantage.
Step II: After the second message M2 is sent, the advantage is still small, only
O(
√
δ(|M1|+ |M2|)). Here we use statistical distance to measure the advantage,
for reasons we will explain below.
Step III: When the expression in (1) is small (i.e., the players only have a small “advantage”),
then indeed, Eve can break the security of the protocol, by pretending to be one
of the players and sampling the secret key that this player would output.
Next we explain in more detail how each step is carried out.
4.2 Outline of the Proof
Step III: How Eve breaks security
Let us start from the end: suppose that after the second round, the “advantage” is small:
If (S2,F(S2); M2|Y,M1,V1E) ≤ β,
where β = O(
√
δ(|M1|+ |M2|)) 1. Here, the advantage is measured in statistical distance
(that is, we take f(t) = |t− 1|/2). We want to show that Eve can break the security of the
protocol, by guessing the secret key.
As we said, Eve’s strategy is to “pretend” that she is Bob, and sample Bob’s output,
outB.
In a general protocol, to do this, Eve needs to sample Bob’s queries Y and the answers
F(Y), and then she can compute outB = outB(Y,F(Y),M1,M2). However, recall that we
transformed the protocol so that outB is a fixed function of Y; therefore, Eve in fact needs to
do nothing clever, only sample Y given her view M1,M2, E1,F(E1) and compute outB from Y.
We need to show that Eve’s key is close to the correct distribution, the one used by the
players. In general, if too much communication is allowed, this is not true, as shown by the
following example.
I Example 9. In Merkle’s puzzles, Alice’s message is F(X), and Bob responds with F(s),
where s ∈ X∩Y is some intersection query. The original secret key (before our transformation)
is the first bit s1. After our transformation, the secret key is Y1`+1, and as part of M2, Bob
sends Alice the bit b = s1 ⊕Y1`+1 so that she can extract Y1`+1.
From Alice’s perspective, given X,F(X), Bob’s message M2 = F(s),b fixes Y1`+1 to the
value b⊕ s1. (We ignore here the tiny probability that s cannot be uniquely computed from
X,F(X) and F(s), i.e., the probability of a collision in F.) However, from Eve’s perspective,
because she does not know X,F(X) and she asks no queries (there are no heavy queries in
Merkle’s puzzles), the intersection element s remains uniformly random. When Eve samples
Y1`+1 given M1,M2 and her non-existent heavy queries, the result is random, and completely
independent from the true secret key.
We need to show that when the players’ advantage is small, then the example above
cannot happen, and Eve’s key agrees with the players’ w.h.p. To this end, we are interested
in the difference between Eve’s “pretend distribution”, and the true distribution that the
players use to produce the key: if the two distributions are close, then Eve’s chances of
guessing the right secret key are roughly the same as Bob’s. The only difference between
these two distributions is that given M1,M2 and E1,F(E1) (which the players do not use),
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The players’ keys are produced according to the joint distribution (outA, outB), and in
particular, both players have the same answers F(S2) to the non-heavy intersection queries
S2 = (X ∩Y) \ E1.
Eve’s pretense that she is Bob is carried out independently from Alice’s view: Eve cannot
use the true intersection queries (which she does not know), only what she has learned
about them from M1,M2,ViE . The joint distribution of Alice and Eve’s keys is therefore
given by the product distribution outA× outB.
So, we would like to bound the difference between the joint distribution and the product
distribution, i.e.,
If (outA; outB |M1,M2, E1,F(E1)).
Given the conditioning, Alice’s output outA is a function of her view, X,F(X). Also, we
assumed that Bob’s output is a function of his queries Y. Therefore,
If (outA; outB |M1,M2, E1,F(E1)) ≤ If (X,F(X); Y|M1,M2, E1,F(E1)). (2)
Now we need to show that given Eve’s view, the dependence between X,F(X) and Y is
bounded in terms of the advantage:
If (X,F(X); Y|M1,M2, E1,F(E1)) ≤ If (S2,F(S2); M2|M1,Y, E1 ∩Y,F(E1 ∩Y)). (3)
This proof is somewhat tedious; it relies on the fact that M2 is a function of M1,Y and
F(Y), and on the fact that X,F(X) are independent of Y,F(Y) given the intersection queries
and answers, S2,F(S2) and E1,F(E1). Intuitively, all the dependence between X,F(X) and Y
“flows through” what the players learn about the intersection, and the proof of (3) formalizes
this intuition.
Step I: Bounding the advantage after the first round
For the first round, we analyze the players’ advantage in terms of KL-divergence, and bound
I(S1,F(S1); M1|X).
Notice that we do not use Eve at this point, because we eliminated any a-priory heavy
queries, so there is nothing Eve needs to query in order to “understand” M1. For the same
reason, S1 = X ∩Y (there are no heavy queries to remove from the intersection).
We claim that
I(S1,F(S1); M1|X) ≤ δ|M1|. (4)
This is not hard to see: suppose X = x. Because we got rid of the a-priori heavy queries,
every individual query q ∈ x has probability at most δ of being asked by Bob (otherwise,
q would be heavy). Therefore, for every q ∈ x, we have Pr [q ∈ S1|X = x] ≤ δ. Because
M1 is generated by Alice without knowing S1, and every query is in S1 only w.p. at most
δ, intuitively, the information in M1 “only applies” to the queries in S1 with probability δ.
Therefore the information that M1 gives about S,F(S1) is at most δ|M1|.
The actual proof involves a Shearer-like argument for mutual information, similar to the
ones used in [6, 15].
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Step II: Bounding the advantage after the second round
Now we must bound the advantage the players gain after the second round, and show that
ISD(S2,F(S2); M2|Y,M1, E1 ∩Y,F(E1 ∩Y)) = O(
√
|M1|+ |M2|). (5)
As we said, we switch here to using statistical distance, and we will see why below.
Following the first round, we know that not much is known about the intersection, because
Alice’s message M1 did not convey a lot of information about it. So, our proof here proceeds
in two steps: first, we “pretend” that nothing is known about the intersection, and consider
the distribution µ′ where given M1 the distribution of Y,F(Y) is completely independent from
X. We show that under µ′, Bob’s message M2 would only convey δ|M2| bits of information
about the intersection. This is very similar to the analysis of the first round, and it is
also carried out using KL-divergence. Formally, we show that for the distribution µ′ where
Y,F(Y) are drawn independently of of X, we have
Iµ
′
(S2,F(S2); M2|Y,M1, E1 ∩Y,F(E1 ∩Y)) ≤ δ|M2|. (6)
The proof relies on the fact that we excluded heavy queries from S2 (recall that S2 =
(X ∩Y)\E1), so given the conditioning, any query in Y can only belong to S2 with probability
at most δ.
However, µ′ is not the real distribution: given M1, we do know a little about the
intersection, so Y,F(Y) are not completely independent from X. Our next step is to switch to
statistical distance, and show that the real distribution µ (where X,Y are not independent)
and µ′ (where they are) are close to each other. Therefore, what we showed for µ′ is also true
for µ, with the addition of a small penalty corresponding to the distance between µ and µ′.
Formally, we prove that





SD(S2,F(S2); M2|Y,M1, E1 ∩Y,F(E1 ∩Y)) + DSD(µ
′ ‖ µ)
) (7)
Under µ′, by (6) and Pinsker’s inequality, we have:
Iµ
′
SD(S2,F(S2); M2|Y,M1, E1 ∩Y,F(E1 ∩Y)) ≤
√
δ|M2|. (8)
So, under µ′ the expected amount of information revealed is small.
Next, we bound the difference between µ and µ′. We show that:
I(Y,F(Y); X|M1) ≤ I(S1,F(S1); M1|X).
This is quite similar to the proof of Step III above – here we do use standard mutual
information, so the proof uses the chain rule, just as we did above. Since we have shown in
Step I that I(S1,F(S1); M1|X) ≤ δ|M1|, we conclude using Pinsker’s inequality that
DSD(µ′ ‖ µ) ≤
√
DKL(µ′ ‖ µ) ≤
√
δ|M1|. (9)
Together, (8) and (9) are the ingredients we need to apply (7), and obtain:
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